Violation of Freedom of Expression Due to Termination of Employment Contract Because of Social Media Posts
Events
The applicant worked at the Public Health Directorate (Institution) under a fixed-term employment contract with a private company (subcontractor). Referring to the pressure faced by subcontractor employees and managers, the applicant shared a personal message on their social media account containing the phrase, “Hey human drafts, manager fraudsters…” Following this post, some Institution managers complained about the applicant, and in the lawsuit that followed, the Criminal Court of First Instance ruled to convict the applicant. Upon the finalization of the decision to postpone the announcement of the aforementioned ruling, the subcontractor terminated the applicant’s employment contract. The applicant’s lawsuit against the subcontractor and the Institution for reinstatement was dismissed by the Labor Court (Court). The applicant’s appeal against this decision was rejected by the Regional Court of Appeal (Chamber), and his appeal to the Court of Cassation was also rejected.
Allegations
The applicant claimed that his freedom of expression had been violated due to the termination of his employment contract as a result of his social media posts directed at the managers of the public institution where he worked as a subcontractor.
The Court’s Assessment
In addition to working as a subcontractor employee at the Institution, the applicant also serves as the president of an association representing subcontractor workers employed by public institutions.
In this context, it must be accepted that the views expressed by the applicant regarding subcontractor workers go beyond the identity of a subcontractor worker and, as required by the position of association president, also cover social issues that fall within the scope of interest of the civil society organization he represents.
The applicant generally used the term “manager” in his letter, but did not use any expression indicating that his words targeted a specific person. However, the courts accepted that some of the addressees of the statements in question were managers of the Institution, given that the applicant was a subcontractor worker and those subject to the criminal case were also managers at the same Institution as the applicant. The courts of first instance accepted that the applicant’s primary aim was to defame the Institution’s managers, but that this was only possible by attributing meanings to the words used by the applicant that went beyond their intended meaning.
Furthermore, the applicant claimed in his statements that the pressure exerted on subcontracted workers could only be carried out by “persons lacking managerial and human qualities” and expressed his criticisms in an exaggerated manner. The Constitutional Court has accepted in many of its decisions that freedom of expression must be interpreted broadly enough to permit exaggeration and even provocation. Therefore, it cannot be said that the statements in question in this particular case require a departure from the Constitutional Court’s previous assessments.
Consequently, the lower courts failed to demonstrate objectively and convincingly that the statements in question warranted such a serious and last resort intervention as termination of the employment contract.
For the reasons stated, the Constitutional Court ruled that freedom of expression had been violated.